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Abstract
This paper models the evolution of the world distribution of income and shows that while
the distribution of income per capita across economies in the world will be stable in the long
run, the world distribution of population may be divergent. The paper then uses this model to
analyze the impact of the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor
to rich countries on fertility, human capital formation, and growth, in both the sending and
receiving countries. It shows that in the long run, brain drain migration patterns may increase
world inequality as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short
run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The world distribution of income depends on the rela t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r i e s ’p o p u l a t i o na sw e l la s
on the distribution of income within and across countries. This paper models the joint evolution
of the world distribution of income per capita and the world distribution of population and shows
that even if the former is be stable in the long run, the latter may be divergent. The paper
then uses this model to analyze the impact of the current trend towards predominantly skilled
emigration from poor to rich countries on fertility, human capital formation, and growth, in both
the sending and receiving countries. It shows that in the long run, brain drain migration patterns
may increase inequality in the world distribution of income, as relatively poor countries grow large
in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to
rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with low skilled emigration rates.
It is important to analyze the eﬀects of brain drain migration patterns on the world distrib-
ution of income since this type of migration has been growing signiﬁcantly over the last 25 years.
Throughout the 1990s the growth rate of international skilled migration has been nearly triple
that of unskilled migration, and most of that increase is due to skilled migration from developing
to developed countries. Emigration rates in 2000 were three times higher than average for the
highly educated and skilled — and twelve times higher for emigrants from low-income countries
(Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).1
This signiﬁcant development in the world economy gives rise to important economic ques-
tions. Is the brain drain from developing to developed countries likely to be a transitory or a
permanent feature of the world economy? Will it increase the rate of economic growth in the
sending economies, in the receiving economies, and in the world economy? Will the brain drain
promote convergence or divergence in the world distribution of income? To answer these questions
this paper develops a model with endogenous education, fertility, and migration decisions by in-
dividual agents in both the sending and receiving economies. It shows that skilled migration may
improve the growth rate, and reduce the fertility rate, of all economies in the world. Furthermore,
when both receiving and sending economies beneﬁtf r o mb r a i nd r a i nm i g r a t i o n ,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a t
the more advanced economy beneﬁts more from this process and for world inequality to increase as
a result. Based on the model’s predictions and on recent ﬁndings of the empirical brain drain lit-
erature, the implications of brain drain migration for the world distribution of income are derived.
We show that the implied impact will strengthen the trends predicted by Sala-I-Martin (2006):
a decrease in world inequality in the next few decades as the main globalizers grow, but then a
renewed increase as the forces for divergence become increasingly dominant.
The analysis extends the existing literature in two directions. Firstly it provides a dynamic
analysis of the eﬀects of the brain drain on both the sending and receiving economies. This is
an important contribution since the previous literature, from the seminal papers of Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974) to the more recent models of Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Beine et al. (2001)
or Kanbur and Rapoport (2005), have only analyzed the implications for the sending economy.
Analyzing the eﬀect on receiving countries is important because it demonstrates that the eﬀects
of migration on the sending and receiving economies need not be opposites of one another. In
particular it is shown how it is possible for brain drain migration to reduce fertility rates and
increase the rates of human capital accumulation and economic growth in both the sending and
receiving economies.
This paper’s second contribution is to link the brain drain to fertility decisions in both the
sending and receiving economies. This is important because the shape of the world distribution of
1See section 2.2 below for a discussion of the empirical trends.
2income is aﬀected by the relative numbers of people in advanced and less advanced economies as
well as by their relative income per head and it is a fact that sending countries tend to have higher
rates of fertility and lower levels of human capital accumulation than the receiving economies.
This paper uses a Becker (1981) quality versus quantity trade oﬀ argument for fertility decisions
to show how these patterns may be reinforced by brain drain migration in equilibrium.
The observed growth in selective migration is almost surely related to another key empirical
phenomenon which has been the subject of a great deal of recent economic analysis, namely, the
expansion in human capital accumulation in developing and developed economies. In this paper
we adopt the approach of Galor and Moav (2000) in modeling this rise. Galor and Moav (2000)
argue that education makes workers more adaptable and so makes them relatively more productive
in conditions of technological change. Thus while the level of technology is skill-neutral, the rate of
growth of technology is skill-biased. We extend this approach to the international environment by
assuming that the rate of growth of frontier technology is skill-biased but that the rate of growth
from internationally diﬀused or imitation technology is not skill biased. When brain drain migra-
tion is added to this environment there is a two way interaction between growth and the migration
of skilled workers. Higher technological growth in an advanced economy increases the incentives
for agents to migrate to the advanced economy and this spurs (gross) human capital accumula-
tion in the sending economy. Skilled immigration also increases the growth rate of technology in
the advanced economy and this further increases the incentives for skilled agents to migrate to
the advanced economy as well as increases the incentives for human capital accumulation in the
advanced economy itself.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the recent evidence
on the evolution of the world distribution of income, on the growth of brain drain migration, and
on the impact of brain drain migration on the development of the sending economies. Section 3
describes an autarkic theoretical economy. Section 4 analyzes the impact of brain drain migration
on both the sending and receiving economies. Section 5 analyzes the evolution of the world economy
and derives the main results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical background
2.1 The world distribution of income: recent trends
Inequality in the world distribution of income is a combination of inequality within and between
countries. Using diﬀerent possible measures of inequality among world citizens, Sala-I-Martin
(2006) concludes that world inequality remained more or less constant during the 1970s and then
declined during the 1980s and 1990s, with the size of the decline ranging between 4 to 30 percent
depending on the exact measure used. This decline is noteworthy in that it comes after a secular
trend of rising inequality at the world level (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002). The reversal is
more than accounted for by the convergence in income per capita of countries such as India, China,
and other Asian countries, while other regions of the world (especially Africa, which includes many
small and medium-sized countries) have kept diverging. Using a sub-set of inequality measures
that allow for decomposing global inequality, Sala-I-Martin (2006) shows that global inequality
is due mostly to inequality across countries. However, within-country inequality has been rising
since the 1970s. Nevertheless, this increase in within-country inequality is more than oﬀset by the
decrease in (weighted) between-country inequality, resulting in an overall decline in inequality at
the world level.
How will these trends be aﬀected by the international migration of people? In particular,
3how will the world distribution of income be impacted by the emergence of brain drain migration
as a dominant pattern of international migration? Before we model the main channels through
which skilled migration is likely to aﬀect global inequality, we ﬁrst present recent statistical and
empirical evidence to substantiate our claim that the brain drain is indeed a phenomenon of
growing importance, with potentially signiﬁcant impacts on developing countries.
2.2 The growth of ‘brain drain’ migration, 1970-2000
Recent comparative data on international migration by skill level reveal that over the last few
decades the brain drain has increased not only in magnitude (i.e., in terms of total number of highly
skilled immigrants) but also, in most cases, in intensity (i.e., relative to the stock of highly educated
people remaining in the source countries). This means that the rate of growth of international
skilled migration has been even more rapid than that of educational attainments in most regions of
the developing world. Figure 1 shows this evolution using panel data from Defoort (2006), where
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Figure 1: The increase in brain drain migration over the last three decades.
Source: Defoort (2006).
The rise in brain drain migration has been caused by a combination of selective immigration
policies on the demand side and an increased tendency for workers to positively self-select into
migration on the supply side. Selective immigration policies such as the point-system were ﬁrst
introduced in Australia and Canada in the early 1980s, and then gradually spread to other OECD
countries. Most recent examples include the adoption of the point-system by the United Kingdom
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Figure 2: The inverse relationship between the skilled emigration rate and population size (in 2000).
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
There is a clear decreasing relationship between emigration rates and country size (see Fig-
ure 2). Docquier and Marfouk (2006) show that these diﬀerences cannot be attributed to the
educational structure of the home country population or to a higher ratio of skilled to total em-
igration rates in small countries. The latter are simply more open to migration (as they are for
trade). Note that the largest developing countries exhibit relatively low rates of skilled emigra-
tion. Besides country size, another signiﬁcant explanatory variable for skilled emigration rates is a
country’s income level with the highest skilled emigration rates being observed in middle-income
countries. The fact that skilled emigration rates tend to be lower in relatively aﬄuent countries is
explained by the relatively low wage diﬀerentials between these countries and potential destina-
tions. The reasons why they are also lower in poor countries are less obvious and could be due to
a variety of causes, including the role of credit constraints on education and migration decisions
or the lower transferability of human capital, which we do not attempt to model in this paper.
2.3 Estimation of the eﬀects of the brain drain on developing countries’ human
capital formation
The theoretical model will show that the brain drain can have a positive or negative eﬀect on human
capital accumulation in the sending economy depending ceteris paribus on the rate of emigration
of skilled workers. As in previous models, the potential for brain drain migration to be beneﬁcial to
the sending economy is based on the assumption that the ability to migrate is uncertain and that
migration prospects aﬀect agents’ education decisions in the sending economies.2 Beine, Docquier
and Rapoport (2007) ﬁrst estimated the eﬀect of the brain drain on gross human capital formation
2There is much empirical evidence supporting this assumption at both the micro and macro level. Micro-level
evidence comes mainly from sectoral case-studies looking at certain professions (generally health professionals or
engineers) in speciﬁc countries Macro-level evidence is provided by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2007). See
Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) and Docquier and Rapoport (2004) for surveys of this literature.
5out of a cross-section of developing countries and found a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. They then used
the cross-sectional results to estimate the net eﬀect (i.e., once emigration is netted out) through
country-speciﬁc counterfactual experiments.3 Their results (see Figure 3) show that the countries
that experience a ”beneﬁcial brain drain” generally combine low levels of human capital and low
migration rates, whereas the countries experiencing a net loss are typically characterized by high
migration rates and/or high levels of human capital. There appears to be more losers than winners
among sending countries, however the latter include the largest countries in terms of population
size (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil). The implications of these forces for the evolution of the
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Figure 3: The inverse relationship between the emigration rate and the gains from skilled emigration.
Source: Beine et al. (2007).
3A n A u t a r k i c E c o n o m y
In this section we describe an economy when there is no migration. We consider an overlapping
generations economy where in each period t output, Yt, may be produced using two factors of
production, skilled labor, Ht, and unskilled labor Lt, under perfect competition. The levels of
Ht and Lt are determined endogenously by the optimal decisions of agents. Agents live for two
periods and are endowed with one unit of labor in their second period. Agents are identical in all
respects except for their level of ability, a, which we will assume is distributed uniformly over the
unit interval, [0,1] and independently of the ability level of their parent. To become skilled an
agent must be educated at a cost to their parents. If the agent becomes skilled, then agent i can
supply gt+ai eﬃciency units of skilled labor, where gt is the rate of growth of frontier technology.
Otherwise the agent remains unskilled and supplies one eﬃciency unit of unskilled labor. This
3The counterfactual simulation consists for each country to set skilled emigration rates at the level observed for
its unskilled workers.
6implies that an increase in the rate of technological progress will increase the number of eﬃciency
units a skilled worker supplies and will cetris paribus increase the relative wage of skilled workers,
as in Galor and Moav (2000) and Gould, Moav and Weinberg (2001).4 The level of technology,
At, in each period is given and technological progress from one period to the next is related to the
level of human capital accumulation in the economy and so is also determined endogenously.
We ﬁrst set out the production function and factor prices before analyzing agents’ fertility
and education decisions and the economy’s dynamics.
3.1 Production and Factor Prices





where Ht and Lt are the levels of skilled labor in the economy.
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3.2 Individuals’ Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individuals live for two periods and are identical in all respects except for their levels of ability,
a, which we will assume is distributed uniformly over the unit interval, [0,1] and independently
of the ability level of their parent. In their ﬁrst period of life they are dependent on their parent
and may or may not become skilled. As described above, skilled individuals can supply gt + ai
eﬃciency units of skilled labor while those remaining unskilled can supply one eﬃciency unit of
unskilled labor.
Individuals make optimal decisions over fertility, consumption and the training of their
oﬀspring (Becker (1981)). Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), (2004), Galor and Mountford
(2006) and Moav (2005) the preferences of a member of generation t (i.e. an individual who is
born in period t − 1)a r ed e ﬁned over their consumption in period t, ct, and the total income of




Individuals are assumed to be ‘small’ and so take the wage rate and growth rate in periods t and
t+1as given. Individuals optimally allocate their time between labor force participation and child
rearing. Denoting the time required to bring up skilled oﬀspring as, τs,a n dt h et i m er e q u i r e dt o
bring up unskilled oﬀspring as, τu, where we assume that 0 < τu < τs < 1, the budget constraint
of a member i of generation t, is
4For simplicity this paper abstracts away from the ‘erosion’ eﬀect of technological progress analyzed by Galor and
Moav (2004). However an ‘erosion eﬀect’, whereby a higher rate of growth of technological progress has a disruptive
eﬀect on current worker productivity while also having a positive eﬀect on future productivity, could easily be
included without qualitatively aﬀecting the results of the paper by adding a factor (1 − εgt) to the expressions for




t ) ≤ wi
t for i = s, u (5)
where nH
t and nL
t are the measures of skilled and unskilled oﬀspring respectively.
3.3 Optimization
Agents choose a measure of fertility, n.5 For each oﬀspring the parent must make an education
decision. Since each family is a price taker in the labor market this amounts to choosing a threshold
ability level, a?
t+1, such that all oﬀspring with ability level above a?
t+1 will be educated.
Am e m b e ri of generation t’s optimization problem can thus be written as the following
{ct,n t,a ?






(gt+1 + ai)di + wL
t+1a?
t+1])1−θ (6)
such that, for i = s,u,














3.3.1 The Education Decision



















Equation (10) provides an intuitive condition for the parental educational choice. If the cost of
rearing skilled and unskilled oﬀspring were the same, then it would be optimal to educate oﬀspring
up to the point where the earnings of the marginal worker, with ability level a?
t+1, would be the
same whether s/he became skilled or not. However the extra cost of rearing skilled oﬀspring
implies that parents will need to get a greater return from education (i.e., the opportunity costs
of education is the possibility of increasing fertility by (τs − τu)/(τs(1 − a?
t+1)+τua?
t+1)). Hence
in equilibrium it must be the case that wH
t+1(gt+1 + a?
t+1) is greater than wL
t+1.
5This is a sensible approach in the representative agent framework and is commonly used in the literature, see
for example Becker (1981), de la Croix and Doepke (2003), (2004) and Doepke (2005).
83.4 Technological Progress
We assume, following Galor and Moav (2000), that the rate of technological progress, gt ≡ (At −
At−1)/At−1 is an increasing function of the skill intensity of the economy.6 That is:
gt = φ(ht−1), where φ0(ht−1) > 0. (11)
3.5 Equilibrium
In this section we show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of a?
t+1. We further show that
an exogenous increase in the rate of growth decreases the equilibrium level of a?
t+1 and so increases
the proportion of oﬀspring becoming educated and reduces the rate of fertility. These properties
of the equilibrium are set out in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 In each period there a unique equilibrium level of a?
t+1.















which is an increasing function of a?
t+1. This is the ratio of inverse factor supply functions and is
labelled ‘supply’ in Figure 4.












which is a decreasing function of a?
t+1. This is the inverse ratio of inverse factor demand functions
and is labelled ‘demand’ in Figure 4.
Figure 4 plots both these conditions and illustrates the equilibrium level of a?
t+1 ¤
6The assumption of a positive relationship between growth and human capital accumulation is a common one in
the literature, see for example Nelson and Phelps (1966), Findlay (1978), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) and also
Galor and Moav (2004), who provide an excellent survey of empirical support for this relationship.
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Figure 4: A unique equilibrium level of a?
t+1 under no migration.
Proposition 2 An exogenous increase in the rate of growth, gt, increases the equilibrium level of
ht.
















Totally diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to gt+1 for every given level of a∗ and rearrang-



















dgt+1 < 0 iﬀ (1 − α)(1 − a?
t+1)/αa?
t+1 < τu/τs. But given that gt+1 ≥ 0 this will always be
the case. Thus an increase in gt+1 reduces a?
t+1 and so increases ht+1. ¤
Corollary 1 An increase in the rate of growth, gt, decreases the equilibrium level of nt.
Proof. This follows from equation (9) and proposition 2. ¤
3 . 6 G r o w t hD y n a m i c sI nA nE c o n o m yW i t hN oM i g r a t i o n
Proposition 2 shows that ht is an increasing continuous function of gt and from equation (11) gt+1
is an increasing function of ht. Together these imply the following ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation
for the growth rate of technology,
gt+1 = φ(ht(gt)) (14)
10where from above it follows that dgt+1/dgt > 0.
Since dgt+1/dgt > 0 ∀gt it follows that steady state levels of gt will be either stable or
unstable. Figure 5 depicts the case of multiple steady state equilibria. The case of a unique steady
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Figure 5: Growth Dynamics.
4T h e E ﬀect of Brain Drain Migration on Sending and Receiving
Countries
In this section we will describe the eﬀects of a permanent brain drain on both the sending and
receiving economies. We show that a brain drain can increase the growth rate in both the sending
and receiving economies. We do this for each economy separately. In section 5 we put the two
economies together and analyze the joint evolution of the income and population in the world
economy. We assume for simplicity that migration is limited to a proportion, x%, of the receiving
economy’s working population.7
4.1 The Receiving Economy
The permanent immigration of skilled workers to an economy will have both static and dynamic
eﬀects on the receiving economy. The static eﬀect reduces the proportion of indigenous agents
who choose to become skilled workers and this ceteris paribus increases the fertility rate. The
dynamic eﬀect is for the receiving economy to converge to a new higher steady state growth rate.
This has a positive eﬀect on the proportion of agents who choose to become skilled workers and a
7This is a simplifying assumption but one which, we conjecture, would be the equilibrium policy in a simple
median voter political economy model of the receiving economy where agents also receive utility from an exogenous
public good such as land and where this utility is decreasing in the level of the population.
11negative eﬀect on the fertility rate. Thus if the dynamic eﬀe c to u t w e i g h st h es t a t i ce ﬀect, the long
run eﬀect of the permanent immigration of skilled workers will be a raised level of human capital
accumulation, a lower fertility rate and an increase in the growth rate in the receiving economy.
We demonstrate these results in the following subsections
4.1.1 Static Eﬀects
The immigration of skilled workers to an economy will, ceteris paribus, decrease the equilibrium
wage of skilled workers. This will, ceteris paribus, reduce the proportion of indigenous agents who
choose to become skilled workers and so increase the fertility rate. Nevertheless the proportion of
skilled labor in the economy, h, will increase as a result of the skilled immigration. This is shown
in the following lemma and corollary where we denote the equilibrium ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor after the immigration of M skilled workers, as hA
BD(M), where M is x%, of the receiving
economy’s working population
Lemma 1 The immigration of M skilled workers in the advanced economy A, ceteris paribus
increases the equilibrium ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, with hA
BD(M) an increasing function of
M.
Proof. Using Figure 6 and equations (13) and (12). An inﬂow of M skilled workers written means














where aM is the average ability level of the immigrating workers. Thus the factor price relationship
(13) shifts upward. i.e. the increased supply of skilled labor will increase the equilibrium level of
wL
t+1/wH
t+1 for every given level of a?
t+1.
The relationship between wL
t /wH
t and the optimal threshold level of a?
t+1 for indigenous
workers is not aﬀected by the inﬂow of skilled workers. Thus as Figure 6 shows, in equilibrium
the optimal level of at a?
t+1 rises but so does wL
t /wH
t .S i n c ewL
t /wH
t =( ( 1− α)/α)ht this implies
that ht also rises in equilibrium. ¤


















Figure 6: For a given growth rate, skilled immigration reduces the proportion of indigenous
agents becoming skilled.
Corollary 2 The immigration of skilled workers in the advanced economy A, ceteris paribus in-
creases the fertility rate, nt, of economy A.
Proof. From lemma 1 we know that an inﬂow of skilled workers will increase the optimal level
of a?
t+1 and hence from equation (9) the corollary follows. ¤
4.1.2 Dynamic Eﬀects
For every given level of gt, lemma 1 shows that the inﬂow of x% skilled workers will increase the
equilibrium level of ht. This will increase gt+1 and so may lead ultimately to a fall in fertility in
the receiving economy as the following lemma and corollary demonstrate.
Lemma 2 The permanent immigration of x% skilled workers in the advanced economy A,i n -
creases the equilibrium growth rate of economy A.
Proof. The inﬂow of x% skilled workers increases the equilibrium level of ht. This implies that
the dynamic equation now becomes gt = φ(ht−1(gt−1,x)) where ht−1 is an increasing function of
both arguments. Thus as depicted in Figure 7, a permanent immigration of x% skilled workers
each period shifts up the function φ(ht−1(gt−1,x)) relative to φ(ht−1(gt−1,0)) and so increases the
steady state rate of growth. ¤
13t
45o













Figure 7: Dynamic eﬀects of Brain Drain Immigration.
This implies that if the growth eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, permanent skilled immigration
can increase human capital levels and reduce the fertility levels in the receiving economy. This is
s h o w ni nt h ef o l l o w i n gc o r o l l a r y
Corollary 3 If the growth eﬀect from permanent skilled immigration is suﬃciently strong, then
permanent skilled immigration can increase human capital levels and reduce the rate of population
growth in the receiving economy
Proof. By example. Consider the economy where α =1 /3,τs =0 .95,τu = τs/2,θ =1 /3. Then
if g =0 .01 then a?
t+1 =0 .819 and n =1 .188. If there is a 1% inﬂow of skilled immigrants each
period and g remains at 0.01 then a?
t+1 rises to 0.820 and n rises to 1.189. If however there is a
1% inﬂow of skilled immigrants each period and g rises to 0.5 then a?
t+1 falls to 0.817 and n falls
to 1.186. ¤
When the growth eﬀect on fertility of a permanent brain drain outweighs the static eﬀect
so that the long run rate of population growth falls, we shall say that Condition A is satisﬁed
Condition A A permanent skilled immigration reduces the rate of population growth in the re-
ceiving economy
It is important to note two things about condition A. Firstly it can be interpreted as a non-
agglomeration condition i.e. if it does not hold then by deﬁnition the sending economy cannot,
ceteris paribus, remain large relative to an initially small receiving economy. While the contrary
is an interesting possibility, it does not appear to be relevent for the world economy as the rate of
population growth in sending economies is typically much higher than in the receiving economies.
14We therefore choose not to focus on this possibility. Secondly, one should note that condition
Ai so n l yas u ﬃcient condition for the sending economy to remain large relative to the receiving
economy. If the sending economy has a higher autarkic rate of population growth, due perhaps to
the existence of multiple steady state equilibria in equation (11) or diﬀerences in the relative costs
of raising children across economies due to exogenous diﬀerences in institutions, then condition A
need not hold for the sending economy to remain large relative to the receiving economy under
brain drain migration patterns. This is discussed in section 5.
4.2 The Sending Economy
The emigration of skilled workers may increase or decrease the growth rate in the sending economy.
The loss of emigrating skilled agents will ceteris paribus reduce the level of ht but the possibility
of emigration will also increase the incentive to accumulate human capital. In this section we
demonstrate that the latter eﬀect dominates the former if emigration is limited and the wage gain
from emigration is suﬃciently high. This case has been analyzed in the literature before, see for
example Mountford (1997) and Kanbur and Rapoport (2005), and the same intuition applies here.
We will assume that the sending economy takes the immigration policy of the receiving
economy as given, so that each level of x% of the working population of the receiving economy
translates into a maximum number, M, of emigrants from the sending economy. We will also
assume that the ability to emigrate is randomly allocated in the event that there is an excess of




t is the population of the sending economy in period t.8













t+1(gt+1 + ai)di − M(g +( 1+a?
t+1)/2)
a∗ ] (16)
where (1 + a?





skilled and unskilled wages in the sending economy B.
The individual agents’ decision problem is also changed by the possibility of emigration. A






















t+1 is the skilled wage in the receiving economy, economy A. This expression is maximized






































8We are assuming that the receiving economy can only observe the level of education of an agent not his/her
level of ability, ai.








t+1 for every level
of a?
t+1 than that in equation (12) for when there is no migration.
Lemma 3 The possibility for M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy, B,
to the advanced economy A, increases the proportion of agents who choose to become skilled in
economy, B.
Proof. Using equations (16) and (18) and Figure 3. Noting that an increase in M shifts down the









t+1 in equation (18) is always above that for when there is no migration in equation
(12) then using Figure 3 it follows that the equilibrium level of a∗ will be lowered by Brain Drain
emigration. ¤
Corollary 4 The ability of M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy, B,
decreases the fertility rate of economy B
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that an outﬂow of M skilled workers will decrease the optimal
level of a?
t+1 in economy B and hence from equation (9) the corollary follows. ¤
Whether the emigration of M skilled workers raises the equilibrium level of h in economy B
depends on whether the positive eﬀect of an increase in human skill accumulation is stronger than
the negative eﬀect of emigration. In the following proposition we show that if w
H,A
t+1 is suﬃciently
high for a given level of M then the level of h in economy B will increase.
Lemma 4 The possibility for M skilled workers to emigrate from the less advanced economy B
to the advanced economy A increases the equilibrium level of ht in economy B if the skilled wage
in the advanced economy, w
H,A
t+1 , is suﬃciently large




t+1 in equation (16) does not depend on w
H,A
t+1









t+1 in equation (18) does depend on w
H,A



































which implies that an increase in w
H,A





t+1 for a given level of M. ¤
5 The Evolution of the World Economy
In this section we derive the joint evolution of the world distribution of income per capita and
population and show how brain drain migration patterns can aﬀect this evolution. We assume
a world economy made up of two economies A and B where the technological level in economy
A is higher than that in economy B, i.e. AA
t >A B
t . W eb e g i ni ns e c t i o n5 . 1b yd e s c r i b i n gt h e
dynamics of technological diﬀu s i o ni nt h ew o r l de c o n o m y . I ns e c t i o n5 . 2w et h e nd e s c r i b et h e
16evolution of the world economy when there is no migration. We show when there is no migration
that if economies A and B are identical and tending to the same steady state growth rate, then
the world distribution of population and income will be stable. However if economies are tending
towards diﬀerent steady state equilibria, due to innate diﬀerences across countries or multiple
steady states, then although the world distribution of income per capita across economies will be
stable, the world distribution of population will diverge as poorer economies grow large in terms
of population. In section 5.3 we analyze three scenarios for the eﬀect of the brain drain on the
world distribution of income and show how the brain drain can potentially increase divergence
in the world economy. In contrast to the case in section 5.2 with no migration, the brain drain
may cause two identical economies that would other w i s ec o n v e r g et ot h es a m es t e a d ys t a t eg r o w t h
rate, to diverge from one another in terms of population. We also show that if the brain drain
increases the level of human capital in the sending economy suﬃciently, it is possible for the brain
drain to enable an economy on a lower steady state growth path to catch up with an economy
on a higher steady state growth path. Finally we demonstrate the possibility for a brain drain to
decrease the skill ratio in the sending economy. We argue that the current evolution of the world
income distribution as described by Sala-I-Martin (2006) can be seen as a combination of these
three scenarios. Some large economies with low skilled emigration rates may well be on a catching
up trajectory while other economies may be losers or only temporary gainers.
5.1 Technological Diﬀusion in the World Economy
We assume, in the spirit of Findlay (1978) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), that frontier technology
diﬀuses from the most advanced economy, A, to the less advanced economy, B, with a lag.9 In
keeping with the discussion in section 1 we assume that this diﬀusion of technology raises the level
of technology and increases the productivity of both skilled and unskilled labor in an unbiased
manner. This contrasts with the growth of frontier knowledge which following Galor and Moav
(2000) is assumed to be skill biased.10 We follow Findlay (1978) and Nelson and Phelps (1966)
in assuming that the rate of diﬀusion is positively related to the size of the gap between the







where λ > gB.A s e c o n o m i e s A and B tend to their steady states, their growth rates gA
t and
gB
t will tend to their constant steady state growth rates, gA and gB. It is possible to extend this
f o r m u l a t i o nb ym a k i n gλ depend on hB
t−1 or on the level of brain drain Migration, M. This is
discussed in section 5.3.
5.2 Evolution of the World Economy Under No Migration
In this section we show that if economies A and B are identical and tending to a unique steady
state growth rate then the world distribution of in c o m ew i l lb es t a b l e .T h i si ss h o w ni np r o p o s i t i o n
3. However if economies are tending towards diﬀerent steady state equilibria, then although the
9See Keller (2001) for evidence on the importance of technological diﬀusion for technology growth in developing
economies.
10One can allow for diﬀused technological growth to be skill biased so long as the skill bias for an economy whose
technological growth is strongly dependent on international technology diﬀusion is signiﬁcantly less than that for
an economy whose technological growth is completely due to increasing frontier technology.
11See Basu and Weil (1998) for a discussion of the issue of diﬀerent types of advances in technology and on the
importance of appropriate factor endowments for technology diﬀusion.
17world distribution of income per capita across economies will be stable, the world distribution of
population will diverge as poorer economies grow large in terms of population.
Proposition 3 If economies A and B are identical except for their initial levels of population and
technology and are converging to the same steady state rate of growth, i.e. gA
t = gB
t , then the world
will converge to a stable equilibrium, with a stable income distribution and a constant proportion
of the world population in each economy.
Proof. By assumption both countries will have the same steady state equilibrium growth rate of
technology, i.e. gA = gB and so will have the same equilibrium levels of human capital accumula-
tion and fertility. When both economies have attained their steady state growth rates, equation
(20) can be iterated forward to show that in the limit AA
t = AB
t and so there is no tendency for
levels of technology in the two economies to diverge, thus the proposition follows. ¤
Proposition 4 If economies A and B are tending to diﬀerent steady state rates of growth where
gA
t > gB
t but are otherwise identical, then the long run world distribution of income per capita
across economies will be stable but the world distribution of population will be divergent as poorer
economies grow large in terms of population.
Proof. When both economies have attained their steady state growth rates equation (20) can be
iterated forward to show that in the long run the technological level of economy B tends to a




λ + gA − gBAA
t (21)
Thus the ratio of the technology levels in the two economies will be stable. Given that both
economies will also tend to a steady state level of g and h this implies that the ratio of per capita
income in the two economies will also be constant. The fertility rates in the two economies,
however will be diﬀerent since gA
t > gB
t . From proposition 2 and lemma 1 the rate of population
growth in economy B will be higher than that in economy A and so economy B will grow large in
terms of population. ¤.
We illustrate the evolution of the world economy described in proposition 4 below in Figure
8. The ﬁrst frame of Figure 8 shows the initial distribution of income in the world economy of
two economies which diﬀer only in their autarkic steady state growth rate12. The distribution is
normed by setting the wage of unskilled workers in the advanced economy to equal 100 in each
period. The second frame demonstrates the divergence of the world economy over time and shows
the world distribution of income after several periods, one hundred in this example. It shows that
although the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages within and across economies has not changed, the
numbers of people in the less advanced economy has grown by more than in the advanced economy
and hence that the world distribution of income is becoming skewed towards the income in the
less advanced economy.




u,B =0 .6, and N
A = N
B = 10000. Finally the











0.5/1000 i.e. frontier growth in economy B is practically
zero. The technological diﬀusion parameter is set to follow λ =0 .3+h
B
t−1 and the initial levels of technology in the
two economies are A
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Figure 8. The evolution of the world income distribution under no migration when
the poorer economy has a lower autarkic steady state growth rate
5.3 Evolution of the World Economy Under Brain Drain Migration
In this section we focus on three scenarios to illustrate the potential eﬀects of the brain drain
on the world distribution of income. We ﬁrst show how a brain drain can cause divergence in
the world economy by causing two economies that would otherwise converge to the same steady
state level of income and rate of population growth to diverge. We next show that if the brain
drain increases the level of human capital in the sending economy suﬃciently, it is also possible
for the brain drain to enable an economy on a lower steady state growth path to catch up with an
economy on a higher steady state growth path. Finally we also demonstrate the possibility for a
brain drain to decrease the skill ratio in the sending economy. While the early literature focused
on the last of these scenarios (i.e. a brain drain being detrimental to the sending economy), the
evidence presented above in section 2 suggests that all three scenarios may be present in the world
economy.
5.3.1 Scenario 1: Divergence with human capital gains in both economies
When there is brain drain migration, proposition 3 no longer holds and so two identical economies
that would otherwise converge to the same steady state equilibria can converge to diﬀerent steady
state equilibria as a result of brain drain migration. In this case the brain drain will have caused a
divergence in the world economy and will have increased world inequality of income. It should be
stressed however that in this case the brain drain will also have increased the world rate of growth
and so increased long run income levels in all economies of the world. This is demonstrated in the
following proposition and corollaries:
Proposition 5 If economies A and B are identical except for their levels of population and tech-
nology, where AA
t >A B
t , the probability of emigration is suﬃciently low and condition A holds,
then the equilibrium of the world economy will be stable and have the following properties:
(i) there is a permanent brain drain migration of agents from economy B to economy A
(ii) the level of output per capita in economy B will be a constant fraction of that in economy A
(iii) the rate of population growth will be higher in economy B than in economy A.
Proof. As the probability of emigration is suﬃciently small, from equation (18), economy B
tends to its autarkic equilibrium. From lemma 2 this implies that gA >g B. If condition A is
19satisﬁed then economy A’s rate of population growth will be below that of economy B. Thus the
equilibrium is stable: economy A will maintain its lead in frontier technology while economy B
will maintain its lead in population size. ¤
Corollary 5 Income inequality between countries is increasing in the rate of brain drain migration
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium described in proposition 5.
Proof. Economy B is close to its autarkic equilibrium and so hB
t can be treated as a constant
and hence gB and λ are constants also. Once economy A is in the neighborhood of its new steady
state then hA
t and gA can also be treated as constants and hence equation (21) holds. It follows
that the ratio of AB
t /AA
t declines when gA increases. ¤
Corollary 6 World growth is increasing in the rate of brain drain migration in the neighborhood
of the equilibrium described in proposition 5.
Proof. Growth in economy A will increase from lemma 2 and growth in economy B will increase
from the technology diﬀu s i o ne q u a t i o n( 2 0 ). ¤
Finally one should emphasize that condition A is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition
for such an equilibrium to be locally stable. If economies A and B diﬀer for exogenous reasons,
such as diﬀerences in growth institutions or multiple steady state equilibria, so that under no
migration gA >g B, then it follows from corollary 1 that the rate of population growth in economy
B is greater than that in economy A. Brain drain migration will thus reinforce the pattern of
relative technological growth rates but, if condition A does not hold, it will work against the
pattern of relative population growth rates. However as long as the population growth rate in
economy B is greater than that in economy A then the equilibrium will still be stable.
To illustrate this we simulate the evolution of the world income distribution for the case
where the initial technological levels in the two economies are AA =1 0and AB =3 .33,t h el e v e l
of immigration into A is 0.1% of A’s working population, α =1 /3,θ =1 /3, τs,A =0 .85,τu,A =
0.6,τs,B =0 .95,τu,B =0 .5,NA = 10000 and NB = 10000. Finally the dynamic equations are set
such that economy A is above a dynamic growth threshold so that gA
t+1 =( hA
t )0.5 while economy
B is below a growth threshold so that gB
t+1 =( hB
t )0.5/1000 (i.e., frontier growth in economy B is
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Figure 9 A brain drain with increased human capital accumulation in both the receiving and sending economies
but with divergence in the world economy as the sending economy grows large in population.
20Brain drain migration begins in period 6. The simulations show that the brain drain causes
the skill intensity to rise in economy A which quickly converges to a new steady state. The skill
intensity in economy B also rises as the incentive to invest in human capital is high since the
technological diﬀerence between A and B is large while the actual numbers leaving economy B
is small. This situation is stable as the population growth rate of economy B is higher than that
of economy A. The incentive to invest in human capital in economy B falls as the probability of
successfully emigrating falls. In the limit economy B returns to its autarkic skill intensity while
economy A remains at its new higher skill intensity. Although in the long run world inequality will
have been increased, as Figure 9 shows, it could well be that in short run, the brain drain will have
caused a temporary decrease in world inequality due to the increased skill accumulation in the
sending economy. Despite increasing world inequality, by increasing the world rate of growth, the
brain drain will also have increased the long run income of all agents in the world via technological
diﬀusion.13
5 . 3 . 2 S c e n a r i o2 :C a t c h i n gU pD y n a m i c s
It is also possible for the brain drain to enable an economy on a lower steady state growth path
to catch up with an economy on a higher steady state growth path. Consider the case depicted
in Figure 10 where in autarky economy A has a higher steady state growth rate than economy
B. Supposing that economy A and B are precesily the same except that Economy A is above a
threshold level of h which implies a higher steady state level of growth. If the brain drain increases
the level of h in economy B so that it rises above the threshold then economy B will converge to
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Figure 10 Catching up dynamics in the sending economy due to brain drain migration.
5.3.3 Scenario 3: Human Capital Depletion in the Sending Economies
The brain drain can also reduce the skill intensity in the sending economy. This case is depicted
in Figure 11. As implied by lemma 4, if the technological gap between economies is small, as is
13This contribution of brain drain migration to a global public good (knowledge, technological progress) was
emphasized by Grubel and Scott (1966).




u,B =0 .6, and N
A = N
B = 10000. Finally
the dynamic equations are set such that economy A is above a dynamic growth threshold so that g
A
t+1 =0 .75 while
economy B is below a growth threshold so that g
B
t+1 =0 .7 and the technological diﬀusion parameter is set to follow
λ =0 .7.
21the case between developed economies, there is little extra incentive to accumulate human capital
in the sending economy in order to migrate. Nonetheless, skilled agents will still emigrate since
wages are higher in the more advanced economy hence the sending economy will experience a
reduction in its equilibrium skill intensity.
A counterfactual aspect of the model is that when the technological gap between sending
and receiving countries is large, then human capital depletion does not occur except at very
high probabilities of successful migration where the population of the sending economy declines
signiﬁcantly. Nevertheless, human capital depletion would still occur in less advanced economies
at lower rates of skilled emigration if the extra incentive to accumulate human capital in order to
migrate was counteracted by the inability of the sending economy to easily expand its education
provision. This could be due, for example, to credit constraints on human capital and migration
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Figure 11 Human Capital Depletion in the sending economy due to brain drain migration
15In this simulation α =1 /3,θ =1 /3, τ
s,A =0 .85,τ
u,A =0 .6, τ
s,B =0 .798,τ
u,B =0 .539,and N
A = N
B = 10000.
Finally the dynamic equations are set such that economy A is above a dynamic growth threshold so that g
A
t+1 =0 .72
while economy B is below a growth threshold so that g
B
t+1 =0 .7 and the technological diﬀusion parameter is set to
follow λ =0 .7.
226C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a model for the joint evolution of the world distribution of income per capita
and the world distribution of population. It shows that while the distribution of income per capita
of economies in the world will be stable in the long run, the world distribution of income may be
divergent due to diﬀerences in population growth rates. Brain drain migration may exacerbate
this potential for divergence in the world economy, although it should be stressed that while brain
drain migration patterns can increase inequality in terms of income per capita between countries
and skew the world distribution of income towards the poorer economies with higher rates of
population growth, the brain drain is also likely to increase the growth rate of income per capita
in both the sending and receiving economies.
The paper shows that the emergence of the brain drain as a dominant pattern of international
migration is likely to reinforce the current evolution of the world income distribution as described
by Sala-I-Martin (2006) through a combination of the three scenarios described in section 5. In
the short run it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large
developing economies with low skilled emigration rates as in scenarios 1 and 2, but in the long
run, inequality in the world distribution of income may increase as relatively poor countries grow
large in terms of population.
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